On a pencil case:
Tenderness is completed a pastel
Throughout much of Asia, products that are labeled in English sell better. Since few who purchase the products can actually read English, the meaning, or lack thereof, does not matter. Hence, ornamental English is meant to be seen, not read. Somebody who speaks only English could not comprehend the bizarre messages of ornamental English. But is it nonsense?
Usually, ornamental English results from the literal translation of typically Japanese phrases and sentiments into English. In that sense, then, they are ragged translations. Theoretically, a skilled translator could recover the original Japanese thoughts and render them meaningfully into English.
On the other hand, the odd writing seen on Japanese products attracted attention in the West, and people attempted to reproduce it. To make a fashion statement, American and British designers began to adorn garments with strange messages similar to ornamental English. For instance, a British manufacturer emblazoned the incomprehensible words “Rodeo-100 Percent Boys for Atomic Atlas” on a fashionable jacket. Hence, ornamental English is a transitional phenomenon with one foot in meaningful language and the other foot in unintelligible nonsense.
Baby Talk
Baby talk, or motherese, is also midway between meaningful language and nonsense. Adults sometimes use simplified grammar and exaggerated intonation when talking to infants or toddlers. Some adults say that baby talk makes it easier for children to understand language. Some adults justify baby talk as an expression of affection.
Baby talk also contains a smattering of silly sounding, made-up nonsense expressions such as “kitchy-kitchy-coo.” Mostly, however, baby talk is not nonsense, but meaningful language made more accessible to the young. In other words, for the most part, baby talk is simplified sense, not nonsense.
In sum, ornamental English and baby talk straddle the fence between meaningful language and unintelligible nonsense. Additional forms of language can be found that are intermediary between sense and nonsense. However, it is important to remember that borderline cases do not imperil the concept of nonsense. To reiterate, borderline cases of nonsense exist because there are clear-cut cases of nonsense with which to contrast them.
Metalanguage
Nonsense can be described meaningfully in metalanguage, which is language about language. Does the theory of nonsense harbor the seeds of its own destruction? Some would say that there is a built-in paradox in the very notion of such a theory, for the theory consists of numerous declarative sentences that are purportedly about unintelligible nonsense. Specifically, the sentences supposedly describe, categorize, or analyze nonsense or its effects.
Now, presumably a declarative sentence must be either meaningful or else it is nonsense. But into which of these two categories should we put declarative sentences about nonsense? Are they meaningful or are they nonsense?
How could sentences like that be meaningful, though? If nonsense itself is meaningless, then how could declarative sentences about nonsense be meaningful? If they must be meaningless, however, rational inquiry into the subject would be impossible. The entire notion of a theory of nonsense would collapse into incoherence.
In other words, the apparent paradox threatens to invalidate the entire edifice of knowledge about nonsense that this book has constructed. But, fortunately, a concept known to logicians and philosophers as metalanguge can resolve the supposed paradox. Metalanguage is language that is about language. The sentences below will help explain the concept:
Jack has four sisters.
“Jack” has four letters.
Elephants are social animals.
“Elephants” is a plural noun.
The first and third sentences above are about things in extralinguistic reality. But, the second and fourth sentences are about language—specifically, the proper noun “Jack” and the general noun “elephants”—hence these sentences are examples of metalanguage. Placing the words “Jack” and “elephants” in quotation marks is a conventional way of indicating that the sentences are metalanguage.
Metalanguage can be about nonsense as easily as it can be about meaningful language. Metalanguage about nonsense can be meaningful even though the nonsense itself is meaningless. In other words, it is quite possible to talk intelligibly about nonsense, even though nonsense itself is unintelligible.
Now, the statements in this book that make up the theory of nonsense are instances of metalanguage. Furthermore, although nonsense itself is neither true nor false, this book’s metalinguistic statements about nonsense are either true or false—mostly true, I believe; therefore, the existence of metalanguage, or language about language, makes a rational theory of nonsense possible.
Metalanguage also enables us to incorporate unintelligible nonsense within larger structures of meaningful language. A meaningful sentence can be made that surrounds a piece of nonsense and swallows it whole. For instance, quoting nonsense is one way of encasing it within a meaningful sentence. Consider the pair of sentences below:
Reluctant garbage jabbers in green.
Uncle Hamperd took a whiff of nitrous oxide and said, “Reluctant garbage jabbers in green.”
The first sentence is unintelligible nonsense. Nevertheless, the second sentence, which directly quotes the first, is meaningful as a report of something somebody said. In other words, a sentence that directly quotes a nonsensical utterance may be meaningful. In summary, the concept of metalanguage resolves certain puzzles concerning the possibility of meaningful language about unintelligible nonsense.
Resolving Disputes Through Nonsense
Calling proposed new ideas “unintelligible nonsense” is a common form of objection in rational debates. Reasonable people sometimes disagree over whether proposed ideas are nonsense, yet there are no public rules and conventions, no rational standards for settling disagreements like those.
The theory of nonsense provides a sound rational basis for resolving some such disputes. Specifically, we saw that nonsense can be deliberate or involuntary. Either way, though, nonsense has the same structural patterns.
Now, presumably, scientists and academicians don’t talk nonsense on purpose. If they lapse into unintelligible language and ideas, their nonsense is involuntary. Still, we can prove it is nonsense if its structural pattern matches one or more of the many types of deliberate nonsense we have already identified.
The principle seems obvious. However, a specific example is necessary. The following demonstration uses the typology of nonsense to resolve a documented historical dispute concerning unintelligibility. The specific dispute has to do with an ancient magical text known as the Emerald Tablet.
Apollonius of Tyana, an ancient holy man and wonder worker, supposedly discovered the work when he descended to the underworld. Apollonius claimed he had found a secret subterranean chamber in which an old man sat upon a golden throne. In his hand, the man held a tablet made of pure emerald. Apollonius saw an inscription on the tablet that he memorized and recorded for posterity. Apollonius attributed the inscription to Hermes Trismegistus, a renowned magician.